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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)Q). 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in granting a summary judgment holding that the 
restrictive covenants in the deeds were clear and unambiguous when the language of the 
covenants is susceptible to multiple interpretations? Standard of review: "Summary 
judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the mov-
ing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 
104 (Utah 1991). 
2. Did the trial court err in ruling that under the "law of the case" doctrine it 
could not reconsider the prior judge's ruling regarding whether the restrictive covenants 
are ambiguous? Standard of review: Whether the trial court appropriately applied the 
"law of the case" doctrine constitutes a legal question reviewed under a correction of 
error standard. Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1999 UT App 80, 977 P.2d 508. 
3. Did the trial court err in denying plaintiffs motion to alter or amend the 
judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. 59 or 60? Standard of review: Granting or denying 
a motion under Rule 59 is reversed only if the trial court has abused its discretion. 
Christensen v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1988). A denial of a Rule 60 motion is 
ordinarily reversed only if the trial court abused its discretion. Ostler v. Buhler, 957 
P.2d 205, 206 (Utah 1998). 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
A. Nature Of The Case. 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment that precluded the jury's con-
sideration of some issues and from a judgment entered after a jury trial on the remaining 
issues. Andrew and Elizabeth Menlove, owners of Holladay Duplex Management Com-
pany ("plaintiff), brought this action for declaratory relief seeking to clarify their rights 
with regard to property that they purchased in the Ellison Woods Subdivision. 
B. Course Of Proceedings. 
Plaintiff filed a complaint, challenging the enforceability of restrictive cov-
enants that were established in 1947. After the complaint and answer were filed, plaintiff 
filed a motion for summary judgment before the Honorable William A. Thorne, Jr., as-
serting that changes in the neighborhood in the 53 years since their execution rendered 
the covenants unenforceable and/or that the covenants had been abandoned. Defendants 
countered, claiming the covenants were clear and unambiguous and, in the alternative, 
that issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. Judge Thorne denied plain-
tiffs motion for summary judgment, entering an order providing that "the non-discrimi-
natory covenants in the deeds to lots 3 and 4 of the Ellison Woods Subdivision the (sic) 
restricting construction to single family dwellings are clear and unambiguous and there-
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fore enforceable on its (sic) face." (R. 464-465.)l Thereafter, following completion of 
discovery, a trial commenced before Judge Thome on March 13, 2000. This trial resulted 
in a mistrial prior to the introduction of any evidence, due to the early disqualification of 
two jurors. 
Subsequently, Judge Thome was appointed to the Utah Court of Appeals, 
and the case was reassigned to the Honorable Leon A. Dever. During the course of trial, 
plaintiff submitted proposed jury instructions on ambiguity and a special verdict form 
regarding the ambiguity of the covenants. Plaintiff also filed a supporting memorandum 
asserting that Judge Dever was not bound by Judge Thome's earlier ruling and that an 
issue of fact existed regarding whether the restrictive covenants were ambiguous. Judge 
Dever refused to reconsider Judge Thome's ruling on summary judgment on the basis 
that it constituted "law of the case" and could not be modified. The case was tried to a 
jury November 13-16, 2000. 
C. Disposition At Trial Court 
Following trial, the jury returned its Special Verdict, ruling that the changes 
in the subdivision were not so significant to neutralize the benefits of the restrictions or 
of such a nature as to render the covenants valueless. In addition, the jury found that the 
1
 Plaintiff did not focus on the interpretation of the covenants, as that argument 
seemingly involved questions of fact that were inappropriate for summary judgment. 
Furthermore, defendants' reply had not sought an order ruling that the covenants were 
unambiguous, but rather only requested that "the plaintiffs motion for summary judg-
ment should be denied and the matter should be referred to the trial calendar for further 
action . . . . " (Tr. 345). 
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restrictive covenants had not been abandoned. Following the special verdict, defendants' 
attorney, H. Ralph Klemm, prepared a Judgment. The second page of the judgment 
stated "The covenant in the deeds to the remaining properties in the Ellison Woods Sub-
division, including lots 3 and 4 of that subdivision, that restricts construction to single 
family dwellings remains valid and enforceable by the residents thereof." The order also 
provided that "defendants are awarded judgment for costs of $779.36." Judge Dever 
signed the Judgment on March 13, 2001. Plaintiff moved the court, pursuant to Utah R. 
Civ. P. 59 or 60 to alter or amend or to set aside the judgment, on April 2, 2001} Plain-
tiff filed its initial Notice of Appeal on April 11, 2001, within 30 days of the March 13, 
2001 judgment. On April 13, 2001, the court modified the costs award from $779.36 in 
the judgment to $114.00, thus partially granting the relief sought on plaintiffs motion. 
The court denied the remaining relief requested. On May 14, 2001, plaintiff filed a sec-
ond Notice of Appeal from the court's April 13, 2001 ruling and moved to consolidate 
the appeals. The appeals were consolidated by order of the court dated June 12, 2001. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In July 1997, plaintiff purchased property in the Ellison Woods Subdivision, 6470 
South 2300 East in Salt Lake City, Utah, from Harold and Penny Brown by two separate 
2
 The Motion to Alter or Amend, or to Set Aside the Judgment was filed on the 
basis that defendants' counsel had failed to properly provide plaintiff with notice of the 
judgment as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 58A, and that paragraph 2 of the judgment had 
not been found by the jury and should be stricken. Plaintiff also asserted that the court 
had not ruled on plaintiffs objection to costs and disbursements, thereby complicating 
the issue of finality. 
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warranty deeds. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 4, Addendum A; Plaintiffs Exhibit 5, Addendum B). 
One warranty deed conveyed a portion of lots 3 and 4 of the Subdivision, which was 
described by metes and bounds. (Exhibit 4, Addendum A). A second warranty deed 
conveyed the remaining portion of lots 3 and 4 as platted, excluding the previously con-
veyed portion of lots 3 and 4. (Exhibit 5, Addendum B). The deeds were prepared in this 
fashion because the existing home on the property, as constructed and modified, straddled 
the Subdivision lot line between lots 3 and 4. 
Both of the plaintiffs warranty deeds provided that they were subject to the cove-
nants and restrictions. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 4, Addendum A; Plaintiffs Exhibit 5, Adden-
dum B). The underlying restrictive covenants for the Ellison Woods Subdivision had 
been established in 1947 and were initially contained in two special warranty deeds. The 
1947 restrictive covenant relating to lot 3 stated: 
The Grantee, his heirs, successors and assigns will not erect or per-
mit to be erected on the lot or lots above described and purchased by him, 
any building or construction to be used for any purpose other than a one 
family dwelling house, excepting only a barn, garage and the customary 
outhouses, and that no dwelling house shall be erected or permitted to be 
erected on said lot or lots which shall cost less than $1,000.00 and that 
a dwelling house costing less than $5,000.00 shall be set at least 100 feet 
back from the street frontline. All dwelling houses built on front 100 feet 
of said lot or lots shall cost at least $5,000.00 and shall be set back at least 
20 feet from front line of lot. And all outbuildings such as coops, sheds, 
privies, etc., and not including garages attached to house, shall be set back 
at least 125 feet from the street frontline. 
(Emphasis added.) (R. 322.) 
The corresponding language of this paragraph in the 1947 deed relating to lot 4 is iden-
tical except for the omission of the comma between the words "purchased by him, any 
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building or construction" in the first sentence. (R. 320.) Similar covenants were con-
tained in most of the original deeds in the Subdivision. (R. 7, 8, 73.) 
Evidence at trial established that four houses had been built on lots 23 and 24 of 
the Subdivision. (Deposition of Elliot Wintch, p. 26; Tr. 324-326.) Additional evidence 
established that lot 2, owned by defendant Dale G. Howells, has a home and a separate 
building with a storage area and a kitchen. (Deposition of Dale Howells, p. 44; Tr. 61-62 
(Testimony of Harold Brown that the building contained "a sink and a stove").) Two 
other lots, owned by Elsie Brady, had a principal residence and two "guest houses." (Tr. 
62, 86, 206, 348.) 
Harold Brown, the seller of the property to the plaintiffs, believed the covenants 
were confusing and not easy to understand or apply. (Tr. 55.) Prior to selling the prop-
erty to Andrew and Elizabeth Menlove, Mr. Brown had hired an attorney, who had 
provided a legal opinion regarding the covenants. (Tr. 12, 76.)3 The attorney provided 
his opinion that the covenants were difficult to understand with regard to what they 
would or would not allow. (Tr. 12, 76.) 
In 1997, when plaintiff purchased its property, the property had one home that 
straddled lots 3 and 4 as they had been platted. (Tr. 16.) Salt Lake City's building divi-
sion informed plaintiff that the land was zoned in such a manner as to allow construction 
of two additional twin homes. (Tr. 7.) In addition, an attorney at a community council 
3
 Although the attorney's opinion letter was ultimately not admitted into evidence, 
the court permitted Mr. Brown's and Mr. Menlove's testimony regarding "several" legal 
opinions. (Tr. 12-13,72.) The denied exhibit is located at R. 815-817. 
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meeting also opined that he did know what the covenants would or would not restrict. 
(Tr. 13.) Shortly after purchasing the property and with the knowledge of the neighbors, 
plaintiff remodeled the existing home on the platted lots into a duplex. (Tr. 16, 29.)4 
Plaintiff filed this action seeking declaratory relief for clarification regarding the 
restrictive covenants. (R. 1-15.) Following discovery, plaintiff filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment asserting that changes in the neighborhood rendered the covenants unen-
forceable and that the covenants had been abandoned. (R. 302-326.) Defendants filed a 
memorandum in opposition, asserting that the covenants were clear and unambiguous and 
that the restrictive covenants had not been abandoned. (R. 329-351 .)5 In ruling on this 
motion, Judge William A. Thorne, Jr. entered an order providing that "the non-discrimi-
natory covenants in the deeds to lots 3 and 4 of the Ellison Woods Subdivision the (sic) 
restricting construction to single family dwellings are clear and unambiguous and there-
fore enforceable on its (sic) face." (R. 464-465.) The court declined to rule on whether 
the covenants had been abandoned or whether changes to the nature of the neighborhood 
rendered the covenants unenforceable, stating that these issues presented questions of 
fact. (R. 464.) Trial was commenced before Judge Thorne on March 13, 2000 and re-
sulted in a mistrial due to the disqualification of two jurors. (R. 636-637.) 
Following Judge Thome's appointment to the Utah Court of Appeals, the case was 
then transferred to Judge Leon A. Dever. During the reconvened trial, plaintiff requested 
4
 To date, no formal objection has been made to this duplex. 
5
 Defendants did not file a cross motion for summary judgment. 
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that Judge Dever reconsider whether the covenants were ambiguous and requested a jury 
instruction and special verdict on this issue. (R. 821, 841.) The court did not immedi-
ately rule on the motion. At trial, defendants also moved for a directed verdict, arguing 
that the court's summary judgment ruling that the covenants were unambiguous was 'law 
of the case" and could not be revisited and plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the changes 
in the neighborhood rendered the covenants void and unenforceable. (Tr. 158-161.) 
Plaintiff countered that Judge Thome's ruling was not a final judgment and that the "law 
of the case" doctrine did not prohibit the court from reconsidering whether the covenants 
were ambiguous. (Tr. 170-176.) Judge Dever refused to reconsider Judge Thome's 
earlier ruling, relying on the "law of the case" doctrine.6 
During trial Mr. Elliott J. Wintch, a property owner in the Ellison Woods Subdi-
vision, testified that he had purchased two lots in approximately 1953. (Tr. 317.) The 
Wintch deeds contained language substantially identical to that in the restrictive cove-
nants on lots 3 and 4. (Tr. 338.) Mr. Wintch built his home on lots 23 and 24, and then 
sold portions of his property to other owners who have each built a home on the property. 
(Tr. 338.) The Subdivision lots 23 and 24 now have four structures on two lots. (Tr. 
241.) 
6
 Specifically, Judge Dever stated "it's clear from the order issued by Judge 
Thome . . . that [the covenants] are clear and unambiguous and therefore enforceable, 
and that's the order signed by Judge Thome in this matter on the 21st day of September 
and I'm not overturning that order." (Tr. 176.) 
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Jack Brown, defendants' expert witness and a licensed real estate appraiser, testi-
fied at trial that the four residences on these two lots constituted a violation of the cove-
nants. (Tr. 241.) At trial, Mr. Klemm attempted to distinguish these pieces of property on 
the basis that they were sold by metes and bounds descriptions rather than by lots. How-
ever, Mr. Wintch testified that despite "fifty years of building homes," he did not believe 
there was a difference between a "parcel" and a "lot." (Tr. 326.) 
Following the trial, the jury returned a special verdict form stating that the changes 
in the neighborhood had not neutralized the benefit of the restrictive covenants to the 
point that the restriction was no longer valid and enforceable, that the changes had not 
been of such a nature to render the covenant valueless, and that the restrictive covenants 
in the deeds to the Ellison Woods Subdivision had not been abandoned. (R. 868-869.) 
Thereafter, defendants submitted a judgment to the court including the jury verdict 
and adding to the jury's verdict a new provision, stating in paragraph 2, "The covenant in 
the deeds to the remaining properties in the Ellison Woods Subdivision, including Lots 3 
and 4 of that subdivision, that restricts construction to single family dwellings remains 
valid and enforceable by the residents thereof." (R. 931-933.) Judgment was signed on 
March 13, 2001 and entered on March 14, 2001. (R. 934.) 
Following entry of Judgment, on April 2,2001 plaintiff filed a motion, pursuant to 
Utah R. Civ. P. 59 or 60, to Alter, Amend or Set Aside the Judgment, claiming, among 
other things, that the judgment had erroneously included paragraph 2, adopting one inter-
pretation of the restrictive covenants, and also that the costs and disbursements award in 
the judgment was incorrect. (R. 950.) In response to this motion, the court modified the 
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costs award from $779.36 in the judgment to $114.00, thus partially granting the relief 
sought. (R. 962.) The court denied the remaining relief requested. (R. 962.) 
Following and in light of the jury's verdict, plaintiff submitted an application to 
Salt Lake County and obtained a building permit to convert the existing duplex into a 
condominium and to construct two single-family dwellings on the remainder of his prop-
erty. (R. 1010-1013.) The plaintiff s permit was granted and construction begun. On 
May 3, 2001, defendants filed a motion for a stay, restraining plaintiff from completing 
these single-family dwellings on the property. (R. 995.) Plaintiff filed a motion in oppo-
sition, stating that following the jury verdict, plaintiff had altered his plans and submitted 
and obtained approval from Salt Lake County to construct two single-family dwellings on 
its remaining property. (R. 1030-1043.) The plaintiff s proposed single-family dwell-
ings, coupled with the existing duplex on the lots, would create four dwelling units on 
two lots. (R. 1030.) This would be identical to the number of units on lots 23 and 24, 
which defendants had argued to the jury did not constitute a violation of the protective 
covenants. (Tr. 481.) Following the post-trial motion, the court enjoined plaintiffs con-
struction of the additional single-family residences on the property pending this appeal. 
(R. 1068.)8 
7
 In his closing argument to the jury, defendants' counsel argued that the construc-
tion of four houses on lots 23 and 24 "wasn't a violation [of the covenants] at all. What it 
was was somebody's mistake . . . . " (Tr. 481.) 
8
 Plaintiff believed, and continues to believe, that the construction of two single-
family units on the lot does not violate the language of the covenant or the order, which 
speaks of "single family dwellings" (emphasis added). It is apparent, however, from de-
(continued on next page) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in failing to find that the covenants were ambiguous and in 
excluding extrinsic evidence that should have been admitted to interpret the ambiguous 
covenants. The language of the covenants is susceptible to multiple interpretations. 
First, nothing in the covenants limits the number of "one family dwelling houses" that 
may be built on each lot. Second, the covenants could be interpreted to mean that only 
one structure may be built on several lots, assuming several lots are purchased at one 
time. Third, the phrase "one family dwelling" is susceptible to multiple interpretations 
because "family" may include a nuclear family or could have been intended, in 1947, to 
include extended family members including grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins. 
One family could also include a mother and father in a portion of a dwelling and their 
parents, children, or siblings in an adjoining apartment. Finally, the covenants could be 
interpreted to mean that the purchaser of several lots who built one home on these lots is 
thereafter precluded from building an additional home or from selling a portion of the lots 
as a separate parcel. 
Judge Dever also erred in ruling that he could not reconsider Judge Thome's sum-
mary judgment ruling. In refusing to reconsider that ruling, Judge Dever relied upon the 
"law of the case" doctrine. This doctrine, however, clearly permits a judge, replacing 
another on the same case, to revisit an interim order. Judge Dever's reconsideration of 
fendants' arguments and from the court's injunction pending appeal, that the covenants 
and order are being mterpreted as creating a limit on the number, as well as type, of 
dwelling houses. 
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Judge Thome's ruling was particularly important where the issue had not been raised in 
an affirmative motion before the court, but had been summarily raised as a defense in 
response to plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. 
Finally, the trial court erred in denying the plaintiffs Rule 59 or 60 motion to alter 
or amend or correct the judgment on the basis that the court's ruling regarding the mean-
ing of the restrictive covenants was not properly raised, presented, and determined. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
THAT THE COVENANTS WERE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS. 
The trial court, in effect, granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of 
defendants, ruling that the restrictive covenants relating to the plaintiffs property were 
clear and unambiguous. However, this issue had never affirmatively been raised in a 
motion for summary judgment, and the ambiguity of the covenants was therefore not 
properly raised before the court. Because the covenants are subject to more than one 
interpretation, summary judgment was inappropriate. 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when "there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56(c). In reviewing the trial court's ruling, the appellate court accepts the facts 
and inferences in the light most favorable to the losing party. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 
813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). Because a challenge to summary judgment presents for re-
view only questions of law, the appellate court may reconsider the trial court's legal 
conclusions. Id. 
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"Restrictive covenants are not favored in the law and are strictly construed in 
favor of the free and unrestricted use of property." Dansie v. Hi-Country Estates Home-
owners Ass'n, 1999 UT 62, /PI5, 987 P.2d 30. Restrictive covenants are upheld only 
when they impose no greater restraint than is necessary to secure the protection sought. 
St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991). Deeds are 
construed according to ordinary rules of contract construction. Capital Assets Fin. Ser-
vices v. Lindsay, 956 P.2d 1090 (Utah App. 1998). "If the [deed] is in writing and the 
language is not ambiguous, the intention of the parties must be determined from the 
words of the agreement." Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 110 (Utah 1991). "A 
[deed] provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation." 
Id. Whether ambiguity exists in a contract is a question of law. Id Where there is suffi-
cient ambiguity regarding the intention of the parties to a transaction, summary judgment 
is not appropriate. Id. 
Plaintiff purchased its property in the Ellison Woods Subdivision by two separate 
warranty deeds in 1997. One of the warranty deeds conveyed the eastern portion of 
platted lots 3 and 4. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 4, Addendum A). The second warranty deed 
conveyed the remainder of lots 3 and 4. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 5, Addendum B). At the 
time of purchase, one home existed on the lots, and it straddled the lot line. Both war-
ranty deeds provided that they are subject to "covenants" on the property. 
The underlying restrictive covenants are contained in special warranty deeds cre-
ated in 1947 when the subdivision was initially created. Those 1947 covenants relating 
to lots 3 and 4 provide, in relevant part: 
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The Grantee, his heirs, successors and assigns will not erect or per-
mit to be erected on the lot or lots above described and purchased by him 
any building or construction to be used for any purpose other than a one 
family dwelling house, excepting only a barn, garage and the customary 
outhouses, and that no dwelling house shall be erected or permitted to be 
erected on said lot or lots which shall cost less than $1,000.00. And that a 
dwelling house costing less than $5,000.00 shall be set at least 100 feet 
back from the street frontline. All dwelling houses built on front 100 feet 
of said lot or lots shall cost at least $5,000.00 and shall be set back at least 
20 feet from front line of lot. And all outbuildings such as coops, sheds, 
privies, etc., and not including garages attached to house shall be set back at 
least 125 feet from the street frontline. That no estate in or possession of 
said premises shall be sold, transferred or conveyed to any person not of the 
Caucasian race.9 
(Emphasis added.) (R. 320.) 
The court's ruling impliedly concluded that the covenant's reference to "a one 
family dwelling house . . ." restricted the number of houses that could be developed on a 
lot, despite the fact that the very same paragraph contains another, conflicting reference 
to "dwelling houses . . . on said lo t . . . " (emphasis added).10 
This interpretation requires that the word "a" be interpreted as a numerical limita-
tion. Other courts, in construing "a" in covenants, have rejected this construction. See 
Lewis v. Spies, 43 A.D.2d 714; 350 N.Y.S.2d 14 (N.Y. 1973) ("The resolution of this 
issue depends upon whether the indefinite article 'a', as used in the phrase 'a private 
9
 The historical restrictive covenants in the special warranty deeds for lots 3 and 4 
of the Subdivision are almost identical. (See R. 319-320). 
10
 While the summary judgment order and the final order do not expressly limit the 
number of houses, the defendants and their counsel (and apparently the trial court, in light 
of the stay pending appeal) are assuming that the covenants unambiguously limit con-
struction to one single-family dwelling per lot. 
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dwelling house', is to be construed as a numerical limitation. The indefinite article 'a' is 
not necessarily a singular term. It is often used to mean 'any' rather than 'one'." (citing 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 3 (4th ed. 1968)). See also Hinton v. Johnson, 942 P.2d 1061 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1997) ("Generally, we construe 'a' as applying to the plural as well as 
the singular, unless a contrary intention appears on the face of the statute.") (citations 
omitted); Dobbs v. County Commissioners, 257 P.2d 802 (Okla. 1953) ("The article V 
is generally not used in a singular sense unless such an intention is clear from the lan-
guage of the statute." (citing 1 C.J. A § 1 at 1 (1914)). 
The court's interpretation of "a" as signifying the singular is particularly inappro-
priate in the interpretation of a restrictive covenant, which should be "strictly construed in 
favor of the free and unrestricted use of property." Dansie, 1999 UT 62, /PI 5, 987 P.2d 
at 34. 
In the cases of Swensen v. Erickson, 2000 UAR 12, 998 P.2d 807 (Utah 2000) and 
Freeman v. Gee, 423 P.2d 155 (Utah 1967), the drafters made their intention unambigu-
ous by restricting construction on each lot to "one detached single family dwelling" (em-
phasis added). Here there is no such unambiguous limitation. Furthermore, the cove-
nants in those cases did not have conflicting, plural language respecting the types of 
structures that could be built. 
However, the deeds in the Subdivision are susceptible to several interpretations. 
One possibility is that the words "a one family dwelling house" can be interpreted to limit 
the use of the land to "one" dwelling house that is used for "one family." This is clearly 
the interpretation advanced by defendants and accepted by the court. This construction 
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is implausible, however, since the word "one" appears only once in the paragraph, and 
modifies the word "family" rather than the quantity of dwellings that can be constructed. 
Another interpretation of the covenants that has been adopted by other courts re-
garding such language is that "a one family dwelling house" refers to the type of structure 
that may be built rather than the manner in which the structure is used. Buick v. High-
land Meadows Estates, 21 P.3d 860 (Colo. 2001). For example, a home may be con-
structed for one family but can be used for other purposes, such as to provide housing 
for disabled children or adults. Buick v. Highland Meadows Estates, 21 P.3d 860 (Colo. 
2001) ("Single family dwelling" language held to describe only the type of structure per-
mitted and not prohibit use of the dwelling as a group home for six disabled children); 
Double D. Manor Inc. v. Evergreen Meadows Homeowners Ass'n, 773 P.2d 1046 (Colo. 
1989); Collins v. El Campo, 684 S.W. 2d 756 (Ct. App. Tx. 1984). If this interpretation 
is adopted, the plaintiffs construction after the jury verdict did not, in any fashion, vio-
late the covenants. 
Additionally, the covenants do not clearly define the meaning of "family." At the 
time the covenants were drafted in 1947, "family" may well have included extended 
family members, such as grandparents, aunts, and uncles under the same roof. Similarly, 
the covenants do not clearly indicate whether a duplex is permitted if only one extended 
family inhabits the structure. 
Finally, the covenants are vague and ambiguous in their use of the terminology 
"lot or lots." The initial developer's conveyance of property by metes and bounds de-
scriptions created an ambiguity as to what meaning should be ascribed to the terms "lot" 
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and "lots" as used in the covenants. While the developer platted the Subdivision, it ap-
parently chose to sell other "parcels" as other than lots. In fact, this manner of conveying 
the lots is the basis for defendants' counsel's attempt to argue that the four houses on lots 
23 and 24 were not a violation of the covenants. (Tr. 481.) Cf. the dissent in the case of 
Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment, 685 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1984) (Terminology of "land" and 
"lot" are ambiguous "since they do not define what is the 'land' or the 'lot.'") 
The ambiguity in the restrictive covenants is further illustrated by the fact that 
four homes have been erected and allowed to remain on lots 23 and 24 of the Ellison 
Woods Subdivision. Mr. Wintch testified that he purchased his property in approxi-
mately 1953. (Tr. 317.) The Wintch deeds contained language identical to that in the 
restrictive covenants on lots 3 and 4. (Tr. 338.) Mr. Wintch built a home on lots 23 
and 24 (Tr. 338), and later sold parcels of his property to others who have built separate 
homes on the property. As a result, the platted lots 23 and 24 now have four structures 
on two lots. (Tr. 241.) Dale Howells owns a lot (lot 2) that contains a primary residence 
and an outbuilding that is sometimes resided in (Tr. 42, 83), and Ms. Brady owns two lots 
on which three single-family dwellings exist (Tr. 348). 
Jack Brown, defendants' expert witness and a licensed real estate appraiser, testi-
fied at trial that the four residences on lots 23 and 24 constitute a violation of the cove-
nants. (Tr. 241.) He also testified that he considered the covenants "a little bit vague in 
one family dwelling house." (R. 243-244.) In closing, however, counsel for defendants 
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attempted to argue that this did not in fact constitute a violation. (Tr. 481.)U Mr. Wintch 
had testified that he did not believe there was a difference between the term "lots" and the 
term "metes and bounds." (Tr. 326.) Moreover, the deed conveying a portion of lots 3 
and 4 to the plaintiff was also by metes and bounds and the deed conveying the remainder 
of the property excluded that portion conveyed by the first deed. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 5, 
Addendum B). These facts, construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, illustrate 
that the covenants are ambiguous. 
Based on these many plausible interpretations and the number of structures that 
have been built on property conveyed by deeds containing the same restrictions, the trial 
court clearly erred in ruling as a matter of law that the restrictive covenants were clear 
and unambiguous. Defendants' own expert has acknowledged their ambiguity, and the 
defendants' counsel relied on the ambiguity of the conveyances in his closing argument 
when he attempted to contend that the construction of four houses on two lots "wasn't a 
violation at all." (Tr. 481.) This is a matter that the jury should have been allowed to 
consider along with the other issues. 
In light of the ambiguity, the interpretation of the covenant requires a determina-
tion of intent, which is a question of fact for the jury. Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Pi v. of 
State Lands and Forestry, 148 Utah Adv. Rep 16, 802 P.2d 720 (Utah 1990). The jury 
should have been allowed to consider the parties' (in this case the neighbors') actions and 
11
 This disagreement between defendants' expert witness and defendants' counsel, 
standing alone, should establish the ambiguity of the covenants. 
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performance as evidence of intention. Id. Had the jury been properly instructed on the 
ambiguity issue, they could have, and should have, determined that there is no restriction 
on the number of single-family dwellings that can be built on a lot. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IT COULD NOT RE-
CONSIDER A PRIOR JUDGE'S RULING BASED ON THE "LAW OF 
THE CASE" DOCTRINE. 
At trial, the defendants relied upon Judge Thome's ruling in seeking to deny the 
jury's consideration of the covenant's ambiguity. In so doing, defendants' counsel 
argued that the "law of the case" doctrine precluded Judge Dever from reconsidering 
the earlier ruling of Judge Thome. 
The "law of the case" doctrine provides that one district court judge cannot over-
rule another district court judge or equal authority. Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 
946 (Utah 1987). However, the "law of the case" doctrine does not prevent a court from 
catching and fixing a mistake, and it does not bind a court to its own precedents. Gillmor 
v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 439 (Utah 1993). Rather, a judge is free to change a ruling, 
even of another judge, until a final decision is rendered. Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 
884 P.2d 1306 (Utah App. 1994). 
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is an appropriate tool to ask the 
court to reconsider a prior denial of a motion for summary judgment. Trembly v. Mrs. 
Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306 (Utah App. 1994). The decision to entertain a Rule 54(b) 
motion is a question of law and the trial court's decision to deny relief under Rule 54(b) 
is reviewed for correctness. Id. 
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Rule 54(b) provides that: 
any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates 
fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the 
parties . . . is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment 
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
The rule allows "for the possibility of a judge changing his or her mind in cases involving 
multiple parties or multiple claims." Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, 761 
P.2d 42, 44 (Utah App. 1988). In addition, where one judge replaces another on a case, 
they constitute a single judicial officer for law of the case purposes and could change a 
prior interim decision. Interlake Distributors, Inc. v. Old Mill Towne, 954 P.2d 1295 
(Utah App. 1998). 
In determining whether to reconsider a prior ruling, the court may consider factors, 
including, but not limited to, (1) whether the matter is presented in a different light or 
under different circumstances; (2) a party offers new evidence; (3) a "manifest injustice" 
will result if the court does not reconsider the prior ruling; (4) the court needs to correct 
its own errors; or (5) an issue was inadequately briefed when first contemplated by the 
court. Trembly, 884 P.2d at 1310. 
Judge Thorne initially ruled on whether the covenant in the deeds to the plaintiffs 
property were clear and unambiguous only because defendants had raised the issue as a 
defensive argument in response to plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. The defen-
dants had not filed a motion seeking this determination. The issue was summarily treated 
in defendants' response to plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and briefly discussed 
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in plaintiffs reply. The trial court was not fully briefed on the issue and did not fully 
consider whether the covenants were unambiguous. 
Plaintiff again renewed this issue before Judge Dever in the context of its pro-
posed jury instructions and its proposed special verdict. At that time, however, Judge 
Dever would not reconsider, based on the "law of the case" doctrine. Jury instructions 
are reviewed under a correctness of error standard. Cheves v. Williams, 1999 UT 86, 
993 P.2d 191. The court erred, as a matter of law, in denying the plaintiffs motion to 
instruct the jury and to provide a special verdict on this issue. After one day of trial, 
the plaintiff rested its case, and the ambiguity issue again surfaced in defendants' motion 
for a directed verdict. In addition, evidence at trial demonstrated that lots 23 and 24 
contained four residences on two lots, lot 2 had two residences, and lots 14 and 15 had 
three residences, thus indicating the ambiguity and confusion regarding the restrictive 
covenants. The issue of the ambiguity was clearly presented to Judge Dever in a differ-
ent light with additional information and should have been reconsidered. His failure to 
reconsider the issue, based on the "law of the case" doctrine, should be reversed. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE RULE 59 OR 60 
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND THE JUDGMENT. 
The trial court also erred in denying the plaintiffs Rule 59 or 60 motion. In re-
viewing a trial court's decision to deny a motion for a new trial, the court reverses if the 
trial court has abused its discretion. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 817 P.2d 789, 799 
(Utah 1991). The trial court's ruling on Rule 60(b) motions is also reviewed for an abuse 
of discretion. Ostler v. Buhlen 957 P.2d 205,206 (Utah 1998) (citation omitted). 
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In this case, plaintiff moved to alter or amend the judgment on the basis that the 
trial court had erred in entering an order that the restrictive covenants were clear. If the 
trial court's ruling is not reversed, amended or modified, Andrew and Elizabeth Menlove 
continue to have practical questions regarding the appropriate use of the property they 
acquired. They have begun construction on two single-family dwellings that do not 
violate the language of the covenants or the court's order, but their construction has been 
enjoined pending this appeal. Can they retain the existing duplex on the property? If the 
duplex remains, must it be rented to one family occupying both sides or must one kitchen 
be eliminated? Does the "lot or lots" language of the covenant preclude them as pur-
chasers of two parcels from further developing the property that they purchased, even 
though they did not purchase it as "lots" as platted? Is there any legitimate manner in 
which their situation differs from lots 23 and 24, which defendants' counsel contends is 
not a violation? Can untraditional families rent the duplex? Can another home be built 
on the property since Holladay Duplex owns two lots, or must plaintiff demolish the du-
plex because it straddles two platted lots? At a minimum, the Menloves need clarifica-
tion of the covenants so they can determine how to best utilize the property. This clari-
fication must be provided by a jury. The restrictive covenant, even as interpreted by the 
court in granting injunctive relief, is clearly ambiguous. Therefore, the trial court erred in 
ruling, as a matter of law, that the provision is clear. At a minimum, the appellate court 
must remand to the trial court for clarification regarding its ruling.12 
12
 Presumably this court could, without need for additional evidence, rule as a mat-
continued on next page) 
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CONCLUSION 
The initial summary judgment on the interpretation of the restrictive covenants 
was erroneous because the covenants are susceptible to multiple interpretations. The 
subsequent judge also erred in failing to reconsider the issue of whether the restrictive 
covenants were ambiguous, stating that the prior judge's ruling could not be overturned 
on the basis of the "law of the case" doctrine. Finally, the court erred in failing to grant 
plaintiffs motion to alter or amend the judgment where the judgment does not clarify 
plaintiffs rights regarding appropriate structures and uses of the property. Based on 
these problems, plaintiff respectfully requests the appellate court to reverse the ruling on 
summary judgment and remand for a new trial. In the alternative, plaintiff requests a 
remand for further proceedings focused on clarifying the types and amounts of structures 
that may be built on the property and the permissible uses for those structures. 
ADDENDUM 
Addendum A - Plaintiffs Exhibit 4; 
Addendum B - Plaintiffs Exhibit 5; 
Addendum C - Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, dated 
September 21, 1999; 
Addendum D - The Court's rulings on certain jury instructions during the trial 
of this matter in November 2000; 
ter of law that the use of "a" is not a numerical restriction, thereby removing any limita-
tion (other than zoning requirements) on the number of single-family dwellings that could 
be built on plaintiffs property. 
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Addendum E - Special Verdict of the jury, dated November 16, 2000; 
Addendum F - The final Judgment of the Honorable Leon A. Dever, dated 
March 13, 2001 and entered on March 14, 2001; and 
Addendum G - Ruling on Plaintiffs Motion to Alter or Amend, dated April 13, 
2001. 
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ADDENDUM A 
W HEN RECORDED M V O 
Anare 
Jl ^•? cf ?oc ^ 
Order No 0401-457768 
Space Abo\e This Line for Recorder s Lse 
WARRANTY DEED 
Harold C Brown and Penny D Brown 
CM 
CO
 f 
£ j of Salt Lake City Utah 
CO 
CONVEY and WARRANT to Andrew K Menlove ana E l i z a b e t h L Menlove h a s b a r d ana 
wife 
State of Utah 
grantor 
hereb\ 
a. *i 
grantee 
of S a l t Lake C i t y County S a l t Lake State of Utah 
for the sum of TEN DOLLARS and other good and \aluable consideration the following described tract of land in 
S a l t Lake County State ot Utah 
A portion of Lots 3 and 4 ELLISON WOODS a recorded subdivision saia port^or 
being more particularly described as follows 
BEGINNING at the Northwest corner of Lot 4 ELLISON WOODS and. running thence 
South 89-50 19 East 145 feet thence South 150 feet thence North 89-50 19 
West 145 feet thence North 150 feet to the pom: jf D^in'u^.c, 
Subject to easements, covenants restrictions, rights of way and reservations 
appearing of record and, taxes for the year 1997, and each year thereafter 
WITNESS the hand of said grantors this 1 s t 
Signed in the presence of 
day of July/ AD 19 97 
Penny D Brawn 
STATE OF Utah 
COUNTY OF S a l t Lake 
On the 1 s t day of J u l y 
and Penny D. Brown 
SS 
AD 1997 personally appeared before me Harold C Brown 
r. the signer of the within instrument who duly acknowledged to me tnat tjhey executed the same 
. —• — — — fJJtary Public ~ 
r/$S\ JEANM.SMITH < 
\ fh7xZs3H\v\ W0 East 40° $°^ 
tSl X O k W San U*e City Utah &4W i 
I VA <KS5*P )§i My Commission Expires I 
I \ S v C H 5 4 / March2fl 19M . 
i \ a y _ State^o^tah J 
Notary public Jean M Smit 
My Commission E x p i r e s Marcn 28 199£ 
ADDENDUM B 
WHEN RECORDED. MAIL 
1958 
Salt 
East 
Lake 
/e 
900 South 
City, Utah 841 .09 Space Above This Line for Recorder's Use 
Order No.: 0401-457769 
WARRANTY DEED n 
Jj-i Harold C. Brown and Penny D. Brown 
CO 
O of Salt Lake City, Utah 
CO 
CONVEY and W A R R A N T to Andrew K. Menlove and Elizabeth L. Menlove, husband and 
wife, as joint tenants 
State of Utah 
grantor 
heiebv 
J 
r 
r 
</) 
/) 
grantee 
of S a l t Lake C i t y County S a l t Lake . State of Utah 
for the sum of TEN DOLLARS and other good and valuable consideration, the following described tract of land in 
S a l t Lake County, State of Utah 
Lots 3 and 4 of ELLISON WOODS, according to the official plat thereof, as 
recorded in the office of the County Recorder of said County. 
EXCEPTING THEREFROM the following: 
BEGINNING at the Northwest corner of Lot 4, Ellison Woods, and running thence 
South 89-50'19" East 145 feet, thence South 150 feet, thence North 89-50'19' 
West 145 feet, thence North 150 feet to the point of beginning. 
Subject to easements, covenants restrictions, rights of way and reservations 
appearing of record and, taxes for the year 1997, and each year thereafter. 
WITNESS the hand of said grantors , this 3 0 th day of June 
Signed in the presence of C 
A.D. 19 97 
Penny D. /Srown 
STATE OF Utah 
COUNTY OF Salt Lake 
On the 3 0th day of June 
and Penny D. Brown 
jss 
A.D. 1997 personally appeared before me Harold C. Brown 
the signer of the within instrument who duly acknowledged to me that tihey executed the same 
Notary Public " 1 
JEAN M.SMITH , 
330 East 400 South I 
Salt Lake City, Utah 64111 . 
My Commission Expires I 
March 26.1998 
. . . StatejoHJtah __ J 
\ 
\J flftrs 
Notary Public Jean M. Smith 
My Commission Expires: March 28, 199£ 
ADDENDUM C 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HOLLADAY DUPLEX MANAGEMENT COMPANY, 
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability 
company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DALE G. HOWELLS AND LOIS HOWELLS, 
Trustees of the Howells Family Trust 
U/A/D, June 17, 1991, et al., 
Defendants. 
(ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
(SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
(Case No. : 980901408 
Judge William A. Thorne 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
Sf P 2 0 1999 
^"0»p*bttrbleH^ 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment came before this Court 
for oral argument on June 30, 1999. Plaintiff was present and 
represented by its attorney of record, Lincoln W. Hobbs. Defendants 
were present and represented by their counsel of record, H. Ralph 
Klemm. This Court, having heard argument and reviewed the Briefs of 
both parties has determined that Material Facts Remain to be Resolved 
by a Jury at a Trial of this Case. 
THIS COURT HEREBY ORDERS: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
2. This Court rules that the non-discriminatory covenants in 
the deeds to lots 3 and 4 of the Ellison Woods Subdivision 
the restricting construction to single family dwellings are 
clear and unambiguous and therefore enforceable on its 
face. 
However, issues of abandonment or changes to the 
nature of the neighborhood that may invalidate the 
covenants are fact sensitive issues and are hot, as a 
matter of law, sub}ect to a decision on the facts presently 
before this Court. 
Additionally, all covenants included in the deed that 
restrict access to the property on the basis of race are 
struck down as invalid-
All additional Motions are to be filed with the Court by 
October 8, 1999. 
Discovery is to be concluded by September 3, 1999. 
Following discovery it is the responsibility of counsel to 
inform the clerk when the parties are ready for trial. 
Signed on This Y-
£Z 
_ Day of September, 1999 
JUDGE W^L^A.JWQKfcffi A . 
ADDENDUM D 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HOLLADAY DUPLEX MANAGEMENT CO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
DALE G HOWELLS Et al, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
JURY TRIAL DAY 4 
Case No: 980901408 PR 
Judge: L. A. DEVER 
Date: November 16, 2000 
Clerk: kathrynb 
PRESENT 
Defendant(s): DALE G HOWELLS 
LOIS HOWELLS 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): LINCOLN W HOBBS 
Defendant's Attorney(s): H. RALPH KLEMM 
Video 
Tape Number: 11/16/2000 Tape Count: 8:53:15 
TRIAL 
On stipulation of counsel, Alternate Juror #9, Eddie Rivera, was 
excused from jury duty prior to hearing this morning. 
COUNT: 8:53:1 
Court Reconvenes - Jurors are present and all parties are ready to 
proceed 
Defense offers Def Exhibit #10 (Wintch Diagram). Admitted into 
evidence 
The Court Instructs the Jury 
Plaintiff Closing Statements (ATP Hobbs) 
Defense Closing Statements (ATD Klemm) 
Final Statements 
COUNT: 10:16: 
Jury retires for deliberation 
ATP Hobbs takes exception to some of the issues and instructions 
ATD Klemm has no exceptions to the instructions 
Court recess until the jury returns - All exhibits given to the 
jurors 
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Case No: 980901408 
Date: Nov 16, 2000 
COUNT: 2:29: 
Court reconvenes 
COUNT: 2:29:3 
Foreman of the Jury, Michael Spencer, Returns Special Verdict: 
Answer to Question #1 "No" ; Answer to Question #2 "No" The Jury 
finds in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff. 
The jurors were polled 
COUNT: 2:31:4 
Court is in recess 
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I CERTIFY THAT THIS, 
ORIGINAL DOCUMEI 
DISTRICT COURT. 
OF UTAH. 
ti^rtjpftfti URT CLEI 
Circuit Court, State of Utah 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
Calendar - Log Sheet 
JURYTRIAL-Criminal/Civil/Traffic Uu* 7 
Microphone Placement: 
n Judge #2 #3 #4 Witness # Lectern 
f / 
CASE NUMBER 'i%u 9C ?', 'O '"' 
Plaintiff 
TAPE NUMBER / / - /(* -?•£ 
CLERK (^ik^Ll^l 
/ 
U/tJe Q! 9-icqt^Jjjs 
vs-{^^tiwjpj&} 
DATE / / - / £ -CO TIME * •S^V.3 
JUDGE 'J^b/ifi 
DEFENDANT 
PLAINTIFF miTNSF.T{ TCts/Uti-rl , tit-Mi-; 
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ADDENDUM E 
" ^ C O U N T Y 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HOLLADAY DUPLEX MANAGEMENT 
COMPANY, L.L.C., a Utah limited liability 
company, 
Plaintiff, 
DALE G. HO WELLS and LOIS HOWELLS, 
TRUSTEES of the HOWELLS FAMILY 
TRUST U/A/D 06/17/91; JACK M. 
MONSON and DARLENE L. MONSON, 
TRUSTEES of the MONSON FAMILY 
TRUST U/A/D 11/06/91; MARION G. COX 
and MARY E. COX; ALBERT R. PEARCE; 
HELEN ELIZABETH MORGAN OLSEN, 
TRUSTEE of the HELEN ELIZABETH 
MORGAN OLSEN REVOCABLE LIVING 
TRUST AGREEMENT; CHARLES L. 
SUMMERS and CAROLE A. SUMMERS; 
ROBERT C. BRADY and ELSIE I. BRADY; 
MICHAEL A. SLEATER and DEANNA A. 
SLEATER; ERMA L. LARSEN; RHETT 
and V. ANN MILLER, TRUSTEES of 
the V. ANN MILLER LIVING TRUST; 
DELORES RASMUSSEN; and ELLIOTT J. 
WINTCH and ATHELENE E. WINTCH, 
Defendants. 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
Civil No. 980901408 PR 
Judge Leon A. Dever 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions. If you find the evidence clearly and convincingly 
established the issue presented, answer "Yes." If you find the evidence is so equally balanced 
that you cannot determine by clear and convincing evidence, or if you find the evidence is 
against the issue presented, answer "No " 
At least six: of you must agree on the answer to each question before this verdict form is 
completed, but all of the jurors do not need to agree on each of the questions 
1. Have there been changes m the Ellison Woods Subdivision that are so significant 
that they 1) neutralize the benefits of the restrictions to the point of defeating their purpose, or 
2) have the changes been of such a nature that they render the covenant valueless9 
ANSWER Yes No ")( 
2. Has the restrictive covenant in the deeds to the Ellison Woods Subdivision prop-
erties been abandoned0 
ANSWER Yes No )( 
DATED this / k day of November, 2000 
f\^feU**Z^-
Foreperson 
ADDENDUM F 
R RALPH KLEMM 
Attorney for Defendants 
Bar No. 1838 
489 West 3500 South 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 Or" JJCG.-5... ... -
Telephone: (801)2954)718 __. A g \)H lb) 
POLES K G ^ S T G5SET 
Third Judicial District 
t , TERE'-J »-! n^gy 
KAH i 3 2G31 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clark 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HOLLADAY DUPLEX 
MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC. 
A UTAH UMTTEDLIABILrrY COMPANY, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS.. 
DALE G. HOWELLS AND LOIS HOWELLS, 
TRUSTEES of the HOWELLS FAMILY 
TRUST U/A/D 06/17/91; JACK M. 
MONSON and DARLENE MONSON, 
TRUSTEES of the MONSON FAMILY 
TRUST U/A/D 11/06/91; MARION G. COX 
and MARY E. COX; ALBERT R PEARCE; 
HELEN ELIZABETH MORGAN OLSEN, 
TRUSTEE of the HELEN ELIZABETH 
MORGAN OLSEN REVOCABLE LIVING 
TRUST AGREEMENT; CHARLES L. 
SUMMERS, and CAROLE A. SUMMERS; 
ROBERT C. BRADY and ELSIE I. BRADY; 
MICHAEL A SLEATER and DEANNA A 
SLEATER; ERMA L. LARSEN; RHETT 
and V. ANN MILLER, TRUSTEES of 
the V. ANN MILLER LIVING TRUST; 
DELORES RASMUSSEN; and ELLIOTT J. 
WINTCH and ATHELENE E. WINTCH, 
DEFENDANTS. 
JUDGMENT 
CIVIL NO. 980901408 PR 
JUDGE LEON DEVER 
The above action came before the Court for Trial on November 
13, 2000. The plaintiff and the defendants contesting this case were present in 
court and were represented by their respective attorneys of record. The Court 
impaneled a jury of eight persons to try the factual issues of the case and then 
received evidence in documentary form and from witnesses called to testify on 
behalf of the parties. At the conclusion of the evidence, the court submitted 
the Issues of Fact to the jury in the form of a Special Verdict, and the juiy 
answered the questions in the Special Verdict as follows: 
1. Have there been changes in the Ellison Woods Subdivision-. 
that are so significant that they 1) neutralize the benefits of the restrictions to 
the point of defeating their purpose, or 2) have the changes been of such a 
nature that they render the covenant valueless? 
ANSWER: Yes No_X 
2. Has the restrictive covenant in the deeds to the Ellison Woods 
Subdivision properties been abandoned? 
ANSWER: Yes No_X 
NOW, THEREFORE, in accordance with the verdict rendered by 
the jury herein, and good cause appearing therefor, 
2 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as 
follows: 
1. In accordance with the prior ruling of the court, the covenant 
included in the deeds to the properties in the Ellison Woods Subdivision that 
restricts access to the property on the basis of race is struck down as invalid 
and unenforceable. 
2. The covenant in the feeds to the remaining properties in the 
Ellison Woods Subdivision, including Lots 3 and 4 of that subdivision, that 
restricts construction to single family dwellings remains valid and enforceable 
by the residents thereof. 
3. In all other respects, the plaintiffs Complaint and this action 
for declaratory relief against the defendants are dismissed with prejudice. 
4. Pursuant to the Court's Minute Entry decision of February 21, 
2001, Defendants' Motion for an Award of Attorney's Fees is denied. 
5. Defendants are awarded judgment for costs of court in the sum 
of $779.36. 
6. Interest shall accrue on the Judgment for costs and attorney's 
fees in accordance with Utah law until paid in full. 
3 
DATED this \ ^ day of V^MVVv^ , 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the JUDGMENT 
was served on counsel listed below, this / day of . 2001 to 
the counsel listed below. 
Lincoln W. Hobbs, Esq. 
HOBBS, ADONDAKIS & OLSON, L.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Felt Building, Suite 208 
341 So. Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
4 
ADDENDUM G 
FILED BiSTSfCT COURT 
Third JtiGicia. uistnct 
APR 1 3 2C3I 
LT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAPCE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HOLLADAY DUPLEX MANAGEMENT CO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
DALE G HOWELLS, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
ALTER OR AMEND 
Case No: 980901408 
Judge: L. A. DEVER 
Date: 04/13/2001 
Clerk: kathrynb 
The Defendants' Objection to the costs taxed in this case is well 
taken. The amount of costs awarded is $114.00 The remaining 
claimed amount is disallowed. All other objections by the 
Plaintiff are denied. 
Page 1 
Case No: 980901408 
Date: Apr 13, 2001 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 980901408 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail LINCOLN W HOBBS 
ATTORNEY PLA 
341 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
FELT BUILDING, SUITE 208 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
Mail H. RALPH KLEMM 
ATTORNEY DEF 
489 WEST 3500 SOUTH 
BOUNTIFUL, UT 84010 
Dated this /$_ day of /Q/UuJl , 20 0 ( . 
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